He studied political science and developmental studies in Cairo, The Hague, and Berlin. His research focuses on international relations, security, and belief in the Middle East, the West, and Southeast Asia. Muasher is vice president for studies at Carnegie, where he oversees research in Washington and Beirut on the Middle East. Yezid Sayigh is a senior fellow at the Malcolm H. His work focuses on the comparative political and economic roles of Arab armed forces and nonstate actors, the impact of war on states and societies, and the politics of postconflict reconstruction and security sector transformation in Arab transitions, and authoritarian resurgence.
His research deals with armed conflict, security sector governance, and U. Yahya is director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, where her research focuses on citizenship, pluralism, and social justice in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Carnegie Endowment offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace.
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Latest Publications. A capability to mass-produce ballistic missiles coheres with these broader dynamics in Saudi national strategy. It may also represent a component of a nuclear hedging strategy, should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the future as the crown prince has suggested it might. With the exception of the transfer of Dongfeng-3A ballistic missiles to Riyadh in the lates, China and Saudi Arabia have not been major defense partners. Even the missiles that Saudi Arabia did receive from China in the lates were reportedly deemed unusable against Iraq during the first Gulf War due to their low accuracy.
A second, unconfirmed missile transfer in , of more precise Chinese Dongfeng missiles , may have generated greater Saudi interest in solid-propellant ballistic missiles—the kind reported to be under manufacture now in the kingdom.
In general terms, China has managed to sustain its relationships with Riyadh and Tehran without being drawn into their geopolitical differences. While a precise timeline of the technology transfers remains unknown, previous reporting suggested that Saudi-Chinese cooperation on ballistic missile technology accelerated under the Trump administration, which withheld disclosure of the development from U.
Perceptions in both Riyadh and Beijing that the United States, under Donald Trump, would probably overlook this cooperation may have prompted both sides to proceed. The Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral export-control regime created in the lates to address, in part, transfers like the one between Beijing and Riyadh involving the DF-3A, is under increased stress.
China, which is not a member of the nonbinding, informal regime, has long pledged to nonetheless abide by its standards.
In , the U. This development is not likely to bolster stability, at least in the near term. How has Washington responded to the Saudi ballistic missile program? AP: Recognizing perceived Saudi insecurity, successive U. At the same time, Washington, as a matter of policy, has opposed the proliferation of missile systems—particularly those capable of delivering nuclear weapons—in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Under the Trump administration, when the reported China-Saudi Arabia cooperation on missile manufacturing may have originated, and was certainly accelerated, confrontation with Saudi Arabia over a range of issues that might have otherwise conflicted with U. This included a reported effort by the Trump administration to conceal knowledge of Saudi efforts to advance its ballistic missile program from U.
MY: How does the Saudi ballistic missile program affect any prospective U. Short-range ballistic missiles and, increasingly, cruise missiles have been introduced into the arsenals of many Middle Eastern and North African states. The rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh would no doubt result in special emphasis on Saudi capabilities in potential negotiations, but Iran is likely to insist that capabilities in Israel and even Turkey be taken into consideration as part of any regional package.
Looking at the region as a whole, Iran continues to stand out in terms of the sheer diversity of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile systems in its overall inventory—and its proliferation of missiles to nonstate actors, such as the Houthis and Hezbollah.
As long as Saudi Arabia remains a nonnuclear state, militarily useful ballistic missiles will be those that are sufficiently precise. The Chinese-made DF-3 missiles that Riyadh imported in the lates had been originally conceived as a means for nuclear weapons delivery, which did not necessitate a high degree of precision.
While presently available open-source evidence points to a pilot Saudi manufacturing initiative, we may learn more about the range, precision, and other potential parameters of these missiles as they begin flight-testing. Iran has consistently refused to link talks concerning limitations on its nuclear program to sanctions relief or its ballistic missile capabilities. This is unlikely to change. Meanwhile, Saudi and Chinese silence on the reported cooperation over ballistic missile production can grant all sides concerned a level of plausible deniability for the moment.
The center seeks to cultivate a deeper understanding of the region by offering insights into the challenges faced by states and citizens and by addressing long-term trends. As freedom of expression has been increasingly curbed, the center has served as a space for individuals to express their views on the region and reflect on solutions. Downtown Beirut, P. Box Riad El Solh, Lebanon. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Malcolm H.
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