They also differ from unmistakable threats that may lack straightforward response paths such as the frightening oxygen-tank explosion aboard Apollo However, when the warning sign is ambiguous and the threat's potential effect is unclear, managers may choose to ignore or discount the risk. Such an approach can be catastrophic.
Firms that do a good job of dealing with ambiguous threats do not improvise during a crisis; rather, they apply a rigorous set of detection and response capabilities that they have developed and practiced beforehand. In this article, the authors outline how to put such capabilities in place long before a crisis strikes. First, companies need to hone their teamwork and rapid problem-solving skills through practice. Second, they must learn to recognize weak signals, amplify the threat, and encourage employees to ask disconcerting "what if" questions in a safe environment.
Finally, they should explore possible responses to threats through quick, low-cost experimentation. Advanced Search. Step 2: Amplify the weak signal. Initiate a brief but intense period of heightened inquiry about the ambiguous threat.
Encourage people to ask uncomfortable questions about the potential threat and to explore its significance--without fear of retribution should the threat prove harmless. Many hospitals have created lists of early warning signs of potential cardiac arrest. When nurses spot such signs, they call in rapid response teams of critical care nurses and respiratory therapists to help them assess the signs' significance.
These teams quickly determine whether a warning sign merits further action and specialists' attention. At some hospitals, these teams have dramatically lowered the number of cardiac arrests. Step 3: Experiment. When a potential business failure looms, formal scientific inquiry into possible solutions may consume too much time or other resources. So, develop a less formal--and more rapid--process. Electronic Arts investigates consumers' possible responses to a proposed video game feature by creating simple prototypes that mimic portions of the gaming experience for which the company wants feedback.
Given the immense cost of video game development and the low probability that any particular project will yield a hit, this "mini-prototyping" enables the firm to identify and address potential problems more quickly and inexpensively than rivals do.
This article provides additional insight into the vulnerabilities that blind managers to early warning signs. Examples include a desire to see the world as we'd like it to be, not as it is, and the common organizational phenomenon of fragmented and incomplete data flows to decision makers. The authors also offer suggestions for ferreting out threats and preventing them from turning into disasters.
Tactics include scenario planning creating scenarios for surprises that could emerge, then designing preparatory measures , risk analysis estimating future events' probabilities, costs, and benefits , and creating cross-functional teams of insiders and outsiders to synthesize industry intelligence. Garvin and Roberto recommend three practices for making people feel safe in asking uncomfortable questions about ambiguous threats.
The practices: 1 Encourage constructive conflict. In Paul De Grau- we's opinion, the rigorous mechanism imposed by Germany is based on a wrong diagnosis which is the cause of some concern. The federal government has offered assistance on condition that certain measures are imposed. Proposals have been put forward for more drastic re- forms, but a real reform would seem to imply "dramatic" changes in the federal system. While waiting for a sudden burst of solidarity, some analysts wonder whether a prerequisite for the granting of financial aid to a State should be that previously the latter is declared to be almost bankrupt.
According to the economist Thierry Malleret, the cost of non euro is too high to be seriously considered. In a nutshell, it has tackled the problem of restoring order to 3 The Economist, 23 April : « Hundreds of mini-Greeces ». The next step towards a federation would involve providing a guarantee for the whole of the eurozone.
One should not forget that after the Maastricht Treaty created the economic and monetary Union, its twin, the economic Union, was neglected. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty's legal provisions for excessive deficit were contravened initial- ly by Germany and France.
For a long period, the efforts to coordinate economic policy and the proposals for economic governance, first introduced by Jacques Delors and taken up again by subsequent French governments, came up against German reluctance.
Yet in order to consolidate monetary Union, economic Un- ion, which is its other half, must urgently be implemented. Efficient economic governance and a merging of economic policies, supplemented by fiscal and budgetary union as proposed by the President of the ECB, and referred to in other terms by the French President and German Chancellor, are all initiatives requiring a general political resolution which also includes a mechanism for pre- liminary examination of draft budgets and supervision of the implementation of this uniform system.
In most cases, these initiatives will need to follow the com- munity path in order to develop into a ruling and directive. At this point, the Commission resurfaces and begins the codecision procedure. Which leads us to the question of the intense time-lag between decisions taken by the financial markets and decision-making on the part of the European institutions. In order to act effectively, perhaps provisions should be made for exceptional procedures to speed up decision-making in the form of community decrees.
The example of initiatives dictated by national interests and the ineffectiveness of measures taken by a Member State or a group of Member States highlights the inherent defects of the intergovernmental method.
It is my firm belief that this method tends to intensify the impact of national interest and neorealism, to strengthen the domination of large States to the detriment of small and medium- sized States and, consequently, of the public interest and general balance.
Using this approach, negotiations are based on divergent initiatives which generally lead to a decision imposed by the large Member States, or to an incoherent decision, or to a watered-down compromise. On the other hand, the innovation of Jean Monnet is the effectiveness of the community method. The Greek crisis broke out following the discovery by Papandreou's government of the immense scale of the public debt and deficit, buried beneath fudged statistics. It escaped the notice of Brussels, Eurostat and Basel, or at least did not give rise to any preventive measures.
Everyone recognizes that this situation is peculiar to Greece and that it is due in particular to large-scale tax evasion, corruption, an excess of civil servants and an inordinate amount of state-owned companies. The response has been as drastic as the crisis itself: severe austerity measures and reforms subject to strict conditionality and com- munity sanctions.
While the European Financial Stability Facility was being set up, the question arose as to whether this fund would be used as an active in- strument, even "proactive", or whether it would be a reactive mechanism serving as a last resort in a crisis situation.
This issue was looked into by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa in collaboration with other economists 6. They insisted on the need to activate the fund to enable financial aid to be given to countries which have fallen prey to high budget deficits in their fiscal adjustment efforts.
Rather than demonstrating a show of solidarity, the German Chancellor has advocated discipline under the threat of sanctions, while at the same time re- stricting herself to a waiting game.
She is in a positon where she is sandwiched between, on the one hand, the need to rescue Greece and defend the euro, and on the other the constraints of domestic policy under pressure from public opin- ion fuelled by the media.
Abounding criticism of Greece has created a "media war", accompanied by lessons on good management of public finances. It took three months of indecision for the leaders of the eurozone, with Germany at the helm followed by France, to realise the necessity of bailing out Greece in order to avoid contagion. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the cost of delayed action and restrictive conditions, without forgetting the psychological "collateral" damage and the revival of nationalist feelings.
On the other hand, it is obvious that this manner of managing the Greek crisis has created divisions within the governmental majority and strained rela- tions with the opposition; doubts have arisen about the cohesion of the eurozone and the tendency is to deal with each crisis separately, often in an overdue and inadequate manner, instead of adopting an overarching approach marked by unity. The members of the eurozone contented themselves with providing for an inter- governmental European Stability Mechanism as of , equipped with an effec- tive lending capacity of approximately bn euros.
The aim is to preserve fi- nancial stability in the whole of the eurozone. Yet doubts remain about the capacity of the ESM to provide a global solution: do its credit guarantees measure up to the extent of public debt? Instead of taking preventive action, it is only supposed to intervene when a State is already struggling with the final stages of a crisis.
The main emphasis is on conditionality and austerity coupled with sanctions, with virtually no importance attached to incentive measures to stimulate growth and employment. As far as the Commission and Greek government is concerned, they have ap- plied themselves, in collaboration with the Bank of Greece and private Greek banks, to developing an instrument designed to aid small and medium-sized companies and start-ups.
For every euro funded by the Commission, the private banks will provide 2 euros. In addition to this initiative, other measures include European aid for regional development and a new law on foreign investment which aim to support economic recovery and employment.
At the same time, the guidelines and in particular the initiatives proposed by the European Council of 24 and 25 March call upon the Commission to intervene. Undeniably, the Commission has a key role to play regarding the development and implementation of concrete ac- tions. This policy initiated by the Commission is a positive change of direction in the handling of the crisis.
Could it be a sign of the revival of the community method? The eurozone crisis is likely to trigger off a crisis in the whole of the European Union. Consequently, the European Union, and in particular the eurozone, have a certain responsability towards the whole world. A new, common show of enthusiasm would enable the Union and its fed- eral core, namely the eurozone, to get back on the path towards the goal of Eu- ropean integration. Inspired by the spirit of this proposal, the Europe- an institutions and Member States would declare their desire to commit them- selves wholeheartedly to the creation of a European federation based on the Treaty of Lisbon.
This is the price to be paid for stability and growth, as well as a return to prosperity. Obviously, the very survival and future of the European project is at stake. The comeback of the community method? Despite the efforts of the Heads of State and Government of the euro area at the Council meeting of 21 July and the Franco-German summit in Paris on 16 August , the euro area is sinking ever deeper into the crisis. Repeatedly falling share prices, reservations about the solidity of French banks and the standstill of growth in the euro area are adequate proof of this.
We must face the 9 Le Temps, 1 June These reflections state the need to reinforce the federal core of the European Union and to transform the Commission into the Union's government. On the contrary, steps are taken bit by bit, proving to be inadequate simply aimed at bailing out coun- tries on the verge of bankruptcy. The reactions of those responsible for the euro area are both overdue and insufficient, allowing speculators to attack one coun- try after another.
These wavering, piecemeal moves are a far cry from the idea of European soli- darity within the euro area. The last European Council meeting was devoted almost exclusively to Greece. It was only in their final statements that the Heads of State and Government defined the following four-point objectives: economic governance, the importance of the legislative package proposed by the Commis- sion and being discussed in the European Parliament, the setting up of budget- ary frameworks and the proposal to create a European credit rating agency.
Finally, they invited the President of the European Council, in close consultation with the President of the Commission and the President of the Eurogroup, to make concrete proposals on how to improve working methods and enhance crisis management in the euro area.
Could this be an admission of the failure of the intergovernmental path followed up until now? This proposal confirms a subtle insistence on the increased powers of the President of the European Council and a shift towards the intergovern- mental tack.
It tends to break the institutional balance in favour of the govern- ments of the large Member States and, in particular, the Franco-German pair.
How can this Council of national leaders, which only meets four times a year, "govern" without the support of the Commission? In order to maintain the bal- ance between governmental power and that of community institutions, the presi- dency or co-presidency of the Council of Finance Ministers should be assigned to the Commissioner in charge of economic and financial affairs.
This rebalancing is necessary due to the Commission's ability to make proposals which represent the general interest of the eurozone and of the European Union. Moreover, as an autonomous institution the Commission is invested with the right of initiative and is alone answerable to the European Parliament.
If we wish to maintain this mechanism of parliamentary control, the Commission should be reassigned its role at the centre of the European village. European democracy is achieved through the Commission and the codecision of the Council and the European Parliament. The uninspired result of the meeting on 16 August provoked a large sense of disappointment.
The German Chancellor's reticence has accentuated the discrepancy between the expectations of financial and economic actors, or even of European citizens, and the proposals made at the summit. The losses suf- fered by the European stock markets reflect this feeling of disappointment. Politi- cal and economic players who had hoped for a strong signal of European soli- darity have been disappointed which has provoked negative reactions within the euro area.
Right at the start of the crisis in , which was originally marked by the Greek crisis, there were obvious demands for a show of solidarity. And yet acts of pro- crastination, vetoing by the German Chancellor, followed by sparing measures, have done nothing but intensify the financial and psychological cost by under- mining confidence and allowing the contagion to spread within the euro area. After a long period of hesitation, the European Council adopted the decision to enhance the lending capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility EFSF and increase the flexibility of the rules governing its intervention by allowing it to carry out preventive measures.
This positive point is pending approval by na- tional Parliaments — yet more proof of the inadequacy of the instruments provid- ed by the Treaty of Lisbon to deal with a major financial and economic crisis. The comeback of eurobonds The idea of eurobonds is one that has slowly been gaining popularity. Their is- suance would ensure the "irreversibility of the euro", and at the same time they represent a vital supplement to the EFSF. Today the Commission, as its Presi- dent declared in the European Parliament, is examining the possibility of adopt- ing eurobonds, in spite of Chancellor Merkel's reluctance and President Sar- kozy's indecision.
Mrs Merkel is worried that this operation will be costly for Germany. As far as the French President is concerned, he believes that euro- bonds should be introduced during the final stage of economic integration and advocates first and foremost establishing European governance.
The fact remains that the idea of eurobonds is gaining ground amongst govern- ments, economic actors and the general public. The German government as well as the coalition parties in power are divided on this issue, whereas the opinion of exporters has been clearly voiced.
Strict conditions must be applied within the eurozone: the anchoring of debt-brake legislation in the constitutions of all eurozone countries, the modernisation of administrative services, increased flexibility of labour mar- kets, massive investment in training. Tax increases should no longer be frowned upon.
At the end of the day, all alternatives to the eurobonds would end up cost- ing us more money. We need economic governance and European supervision of national expenditure, in other words a sort of budgetary union combined with strict coordination of fiscal policy, the first step towards fiscal union. Once these requirements have been met, the path would be clear for eurobonds.
The global threat of the crisis calls for a collective European response. Obviously, in order to be effective this response must be composed of a package of consistent measures, including the creation of eco- nomic governance, a budgetary framework safeguarding certain elements of fiscal union, as well as the legislative package proposed by the Commission and adopted by European Parliament-Council codecision on 28 September The only hope for a rapid way out of the crisis is a coherent series of measures, supported by the action of the European Monetary Fund and supplemented by a programme to boost the economy financed by eurobonds, a sort of European 12 An ambiguous concept as long as its content has not been precisely defined.
It is worth mentioning that Mrs Merkel prefers the term economic cooperation to economic govern- ance. All the more so since the debt crisis has spread to Italy, proving that the EFSF does not have the capacity to help the third economy of the eurozone.
Moreover, such an ambitious European project would put the Union back on track towards an unprecedented European federalism. An enormous European debt market Financial Times economist, Martin Sandbu, suggests that the lesson to be learnt from the US and Japanese experience is that euro obligations should be is- sued Eurobonds would make a lasting impression by creating an enormous sovereign debt market comparable in size to the US and Japanese markets.
The US and Japanese example proves that the advantages of pooling the debts of all eurozone countries would far outweigh the costs, creating a debt market of a size to rival those of the US and Japan. He points out that in spite of the fact that the US has been stripped of its triple-AAA rating, US bonds have not lost any of their popularity. The large size of these two debt markets underpins their borrowing power. The total stock of US government securities is 6,bn euros and for Japan the figure amounts to 7,bn euros.
By comparison, euro- bonds would create a market worth 5,bn euros. According to Martin Sandbu, the European debt market would be backed by governments that together owe less debt, run a lower combined deficit and have greater tax-raising capacity than the US and Japan. Moreover, he maintains that European states, on an individual basis, pay higher yields than they would by creating a single, common market.
In this way, the European market would become much more attractive for investors and much less vulnerable to panic than nationally fragmented mar- kets.
The creation of this large eurobond market would free up new financial resources which could be used, amongst other things, to form a European Fund for growth and competitiveness. Objections raised by the Ger- mans and four other eurozone countries could be circumvented, according to Martin Sandbu, by resorting to enhanced cooperation while waiting for the German government to change its mind.
Let's not forget that the German economy's buoyancy is based on the strength of its exports rather than domestic consumption. Consequently, any fall in exports will cause growth to slow down, as shown by the low rate of 0.
The importance of the European market for German exports is illustrated by the examples given by President Barroso in his speech on « The State of Europe » in Berlin on 9 November, : « It is also a market which benefits from a solid legal basis and is founded on strong mutual dependence within the European Union. Moreover, this crucial advantage of European integration, a single market of million consumers, offers maxi- mum long-term security for intra-community trade.
Obviously, the financial crisis, which is threatening to take hold for a long period, is having a direct effect on German exports. At present, various factors are involved: excessive austerity measures, a drop in growth followed by a rise in unemployment, mistrust con- cerning the strength of European banks, the contagion which is spreading due to economic cross-pillar activity in the eurozone, so many factors which have a decisive influence on the level of consumption, and consequently on the import of goods from European partners and from the largest exporter, namely Germa- ny.
Therefore, how can one hope to stamp out the crisis using instruments which have proven to be inadequate? A global approach These numerous, diffuse elements require a pooling of resources. It is the Commission's responsibility to present an overall emergency programme.
Since the start of the crisis, the Commission has made a succesion of analyses and proposals. Isn't it time for the Commission and its President to take full responsi- bility for their role as leader of the European Union and to take the necessary steps to combat the challenges with which Europe and the world are confronted?
The purpose of this package, presented as a European New Deal, would be to breathe new life into the eurozone economy, as well as that of the whole of the European Union and to reverse the current pernicious trend. It would outline a global vision of the economic and political future of the European Union. By way of conclusion… Ingredients of a European vision What are the main points which emerge at the end of this period marked by the simultaneous occurence of the running-in of the Treaty of Lisbon and the ravag- es of the crisis?
In these conditions, does the Treaty still hold out hope for pro- gress along the federalist path? Or has the impact of the crisis revealed the shortcomings of the new Treaty, of which the provisions inspired by federalism are likely to be swept away by the financial tsunami?
Amidst the confusion and the tremors sparked off by the chaotic movements of the markets and the mass sense of panic, can we start to see signs of a way out of the crisis and a revival of the integration process? Undeniably, the crisis has exposed the indecisive and unpredictable functioning of the Treaty of Lisbon caught between its innovations and the temptation of a reversion to the intergovernmental method, which has been encouraged by the defensive reactions to counter the crisis.
Nevertheless, it is the crisis which has gradually proven the irrefutable necessity of the community method, which alone will allow a common, coherent strategy to be formulated and applied.
This is my firm conviction. The strong de facto solidarity and inextricable mutual dependence beween the members of the eurozone, in particular, became obvious from the onset of the Greek crisis through the risk of contagion.
Meanwhile this solidarity is gradually taking precedence over a defensive attitude which is more a response to the constraints of domestic policy than to the European public interest. The Franco- German pair, swept along by Germany, also fell prey to the failings of such an attitude. Obsessed with budgetary austerity and public debt, it has taken a long time to try and promote a balance between the necessary budgetary discipline and the necessity of growth.
How long will she be able to withstand pressure from the opposition and from German export- ers? Amidst all this indecision and procrastination, it is up to the Commission to complete its legislative proposals and initiatives and to present them in a coher- ent form which can easily be understood by European citizens.
But above all, the Commission is expected to fill the current vacuum by resuming its function as the community institution in charge of defining and promoting the European public interest. In this capacity, the President of the Commission has the duty to pre- sent, in the name of the College, the action plan consisting of the European New Deal. This is the price to pay to emerge from the crisis and boost the economy and employment.
The only way to achieve this large-scale initiative is by having recourse to the community method and appealing to complete European solidarity. This ap- proach implies the creation of a real economic government composed of the Council of Heads of State and Government of the euro area presided over by the President of the European Council.
This Council of leaders will be responsible for defining political direction acting on proposals made by the Commission and the Council of Finance Ministers of the Eurogroup co-chaired by the competent Commissioner.
This suggestion could be studied by the three Presidents en- trusted by the Council of 21 July with the job of improving working methods and reinforcing crisis management in the eurozone.
Doesn't this amount to an official recognition of the limits and shortcomings of the intergovernmental meth- od? Evidently, in order to get round the inertia of the decision-making processes which correspond to situations in periods of non-crisis, it is imperative to revise the current procedures which are governed by the unanimity rule which requires ratification by all seventeen national Parliaments. Two rectifications should be enforced: establish qualified majority voting and ratification by the European Parliament, that is to say by MEPs of the eurozone.
Moreover, having learnt a lesson from the crisis, the three Presidents could sug- gest that an ad hoc mechanism is set up to allow the rapid adoption and imme- diate application of "European decrees" which would subsequently be submitted to MEPs within the year.
This is an emergency procedure practised by the Swiss Federal Council and which enables it to respond effectively to market demands. Such a mechanism would be a way of filling the gap between the immediate reactions of the market and the delayed response of the European authorities. For this purpose, it would be useful to follow the example of the ECB in providing support to afflicted countries. In this way, it will be in a position to assume its role as an innovator at a global level.
At the same time, it will be able to fulfill its responsabilities as the largest commercial and economic community in a world in which mutual dependence is increasing. Failure by the European Union to manage the crisis would trigger off a worldwide domino effect. This is proven by the United States' eagerness to promote a European upturn, by the fact that BRIC have offered their assistance, and by the wave of anxiety which has hit countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa.
In order to meet the expectations of the whole world and rekindle hope amongst its people, the European Union as well as the eurozone have the duty to embark courageously on the road towards European federalism. Contribution to the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome 25th March Europe swept up in the turmoil of world events After a period of U. Our high tech civilisa- tion is prey to two opposing forces: the attraction towards globalisation as a re- sult of the technological revolution, and the reaction against it due to cultural, national and regional particularities.
Hence its military intervention in Georgia, followed by the deployment of its air force in Syria, its reclaiming of Crimea and involvement in the civil war in Ukraine. Russia will clearly do what- ever it takes in the face of the marginalisation which the United States has in- flicted on it by excluding it from the G8 and strengthening its presence in neigh- bouring countries.
Franco-German synergy Regional conflicts have been rising since the invasion of Iraq which both France and Germany refrained from getting involved in. The world has entered a new phase of chaos where the rule of force is becoming stronger than the law. What role should fall to the EU, a major economic power yet still without shared politi- cal sovereignty?
After Brexit, France is the only country left equipped with those sovereign powers which Germany, a major economic power, is lacking. Two complementary Member States destined to assume the role of the driving force of the Union. France has a permanent seat on the Security Council, a nuclear deterrent as well as conventional military strength, and as such is the leader in matters of defence. In turn, Germany is the dominant economic power in Europe and wields superior influence within the Eurozone.
If the Franco-German couple were to pool their strengths, they would act as a magnet within the Eurozone and also within the Union of Yet each of them seems to take pleasure in exercis- ing its power unilaterally. Striking the balance between freedom and security Another external threat we are facing is a « conflict of civilisations and religions » which aims to legitimise the terrorist attacks committed in Europe and attributed to Daesh and other Islamist groups.
These interconnected conflicts have escalated through the use of state-of- the-art means of communication and weapons, including some of the most so- phisticated that exist. In this chaotic and uncertain world, the unpredictable na- ture of the current US President is only adding to the risk of a large-scale con- flict.
In response to the danger of jihadist terror attacks, the Union has created a common database containing data of passengers travelling in Europe — Passen- ger Name Record PNR — and has a system which allows information to be checked and exchanged within the Schengen Area which it is working on to improve.
As for the European arrest warrant, it has been used by France as well as cooperation between Europol and Eurojust which bring together prosecutors, judges and experienced police officers and authorise the formation of joint inves- tigation teams of which the Franco-Belgian team is a perfect example.
To this end the European Commission has enforced monitoring of virtual money plat- forms on the internet, the abolition of anonymous prepaid debit cards and more effective exchange of information between intelligence cells.
This situation clear- ly illustrates the complexity and the European, indeed global dimension of the issue of security. Which raises the question in democratic societies of the bal- ance between freedom and security, particularly since Europe is often in a state of alert. Moreover, the equivocal actions of some States in the region secretly serve to support ISIS which in addition has access to the internet giants.
Moreover these are the values upheld by most religions which espouse the message of peace. The fight against the recruitment networks of suicide bombers and those preach- ing war on our civilisation, requires widespread mobilisation of peoples, individu- als, ideas and projects, of the entire Union and its Member States, right down to the regional and municipal level.
Pluralism of opinions, of parties, of the media, in accordance with our values and democratic principles, underpins our Europe- an heritage which every newcomer is called upon to integrate into their daily lives if ageing Europe wishes to cope with the influx of migrants which it needs.
This concept is also the best cure for the extremist, nationalist and populist cur- rents which represent an imperceptible and brutal threat undermining the cultural fabric of Europe. Relations with Russia What part is to be played by the European Union in this situation which may spiral out of control? Divided and weakened, is it capable of pleading the case for peace and dialogue between cultures? And to protect its citizens against the fear of migrants and terrorists which incites them to withdraw into themselves, to bring back borders and erect walls?
In the s President Mitterrand proposed a confed- eration between the European Union and Russia, which was highly motivated to enjoy closer relations with the EU. This proposal was abandoned due to opposi- tion from those countries recently freed from communist rule but which still bear lasting marks of their Soviet past. What should be our attitude towards Russia, a geographical neighbour which shares our European culture based on our herit- age passed down from Ancient Greece, from Rome and from Christianity?
In the Commission set up the Eastern Partnership without including Russia, despite the fact that together with the EU Russia would have been able to en- sure the smooth functioning of the Partnership. There is no lack of proposals yet they remain in the planning phase. Any approach which reverses this democratic mindset should be banned. Core group of a European political Union As in the case of other matters which figure among sovereign powers, there is an urgent and essential need to set up the core group of a political Union equipped with an executive, a legislature and a judiciary incorporated within the European Union and at the heart of the Eurozone — preferably functioning ac- cording to enhanced cooperation and relying on the existing institutions, only reduced in dimension to the size of the core group.
This is all the more important since a European defence policy should follow a general and coherent strategy defined by a political Authority in terms of foreign relations, defence and security, as well as immigration policy. Such global and hence political strategic thinking will influence the nature of our relations with NATO, whose benefits to its mem- bers are being challenged.
This is what is being implied by the President of the country which leads and dominates this organisation. The political Union would as a result be faced with the dilemma of either forming an independent alliance and developing an autonomous defence policy, or aligning itself with the United States and NATO which on several occasions has proven to be detrimental to the interests of the EU.
These are choices which quite evidently go beyond the competences of the European Union; they are the responsibility of a political Authority with which the core of a political Union will be equipped. The sharing of sovereignty would raise many questions which have often been kept quiet. Should we entertain the idea that France, in its capacity as a perma- nent member of the Security Council, should not be allowed to take decisions before consulting with the core group of the political Union, or even that a repre- sentation of the political Union should be set up in accordance with its general strategy for foreign relations?
And what about the nuclear deterrent which France is the only Member State to have as a result of Brexit? Indeed, contrary to his aim to stop West Germany from rearming, the rejection of a European army resulted in the revival of an independent German army. In the current situation, it is not unreasonable to imagine that German military strength could rapidly expand, or even that it could develop nuclear weapons, which seems to be confirmed by the low-key debate taking place in certain circles in Germany.
Supposing that this were true, how would France and other members of the political Union react? Would France propose to extend its nuclear protection to serve the political Union and European defence, or, on the contrary, would it try to block any potential German initiative? These are issues which are beyond the sphere of influence of the EU and which should be addressed by the leaders of the political Union.
What will France ultimately decide to do, in the light of the strategies adopted by the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and Rus- sia, as well as the unpredictable actions of other States, such as North Corea, which possess operational nuclear weapons? Survival of the euro The future political Union is the key to the success of the monetary Union.
This is what the Bundesbank maintained in It is a fact that no single currency has ever existed without sovereign power. So the euro lives on bor- rowed money thanks to the ECB, whereas only a political core will be able to ensure the survival of the euro.
The situation is worrying, particularly since the demise of the euro would deal the final blow to the European Union and at the same provoke a global crisis2. The drift towards authoritorianism in Hungary and Poland are evidence of this. Moreover, the threats are mounting: the effects of austerity measures on unemployment, pauperisation and economic depression which in 1 Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, February Source : Interna- tional Monetary Fund, figures as at Consequently, it would be in a position to provide impetus to the economic union, to large-scale European-wide projects financed by eurobonds, while at the same time stimulating the performance of all 27 Members.
Incorporated within the Union, this core group would have at its disposal the same structures reduced in size to correspond to its member configuration: a European Council, a Council of Ministers and, most importantly, an Executive and ECB, a member Commission within the European Parliament and one chamber of the Court of Justice. Moreover, it would have sovereign powers and its decisions would be taken according to the community method by qualified majority regarding monetary and economic affairs, but also in relation to foreign relations, security and defence or migration flows.
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